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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast exemplifies the central principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and ending wars—even as this aligns with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This pivot is major, but experts warn it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Conditional Action

An analogous tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.